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Abstract 
Engel et al. (1997 2001 2007) have proposed flexible-term contracts as a solution to suboptimal renegotiation of 
public-private partnerships. We show that whenever the uncertainty lasts over more than two periods, flexible-term 
contracts have a drawback. The expected duration of a flexible-term contract can be higher than the (certain) duration 
of a fixed-term contract, the difference being directly proportional to the volatility of the project.
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1 Introduction
Public-private partnerships are contractual forms between public procurements and full pri-
vatization. Public authorities involve private rms in public projects because they need
private funds for large investments in infrastructure. At the same time, full privatization
is not desirable because the public authorities need to keep the control of the activities of
public service provision, for which market competition does not exist. Under a public-private
partnership, the project is private only during the period of the contract. At the end of the
contract the ownership of the infrastructure reverts to the public authority. Ceteris paribus,
the shorter the contract duration the higher the public benet of the project.
Engel et al. (1997; 2001; 2007) argue that a public-private partnership for building
and operating highways must, at optimum, take the form of exible-term contracts. The
contract stipulates the return that the rm has to obtain from the project and lasts until
the cumulated cash ow hits this return.
The reason why exible-term contracts were proposed is that they have some advantages
over xed-term contracts, whenever uncertainty exists. In transportation infrastructure in-
vestments, uncertainty has led to frequent renegotiations in bad states of the world, when
cash ows were low and so did not allow for cost recovery (Guash, 2004). Under a exible-
term contract the return of the rm is certain (or less risky) and thus renegotiation is avoided,
or, at least less likely. Indeed, the rm is allowed to operate over a longer period whenever
the cash ow is low, until the cumulated cash ow hits the contracted return. In turn, the
duration of the contract is shortened in a good state of the world, in which the contracted
return is obtained rapidly by the rm.
Engel et al. (1997; 2001; 2007) show the advantage of exible-term contracts in the
context of two-period uncertainty and a risk averse private rm. In this study we show
that when the uncertainty lasts over multiple periods, the expected contract duration can be
suboptimally high. The scope of this study is to signal that exible-term contracts have a
drawback that should be accounted for in the analysis of the optimal contractual regime. For
simplicity of the exposition, we assume that the private partner is risk neutral but further
extensions can be made to assume that the rm is risk averse.
The fact that the returns of infrastructure projects are uncertain is obvious. For instance,
tra¢ c prevision is subject to signicant errors, as many empirical studies have shown1.
1One example is the study of Quinet (2000), who distinguishes three sources of inaccuracy: the model
structure, current data and future value of exogenous variables. Small and Winston (1998) argue that un-
certainty about future tra¢ c comes on the one side from economic conditions, technology etc (i.e. exogenous
factors), which are di¢ cult to forecast accurately and on the other side from the fact that the information
is not transferable across time and space. Skamris and Flybjerg (1997) do an empirical comparison between
roads and railroads and show that forecast of railroads seem to be technically more problematic than that
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Moreover, to see why uncertainty lasts over multiple periods, one could think about the
inuence of GDP on the demand for transportation. GDP is exogenous to the transportation
sector and its dynamics determine permanent and uncertain shocks on the demand2. Because
GDP is dynamic, the uncertainty about the demand lasts all over the future.
We explain briey the result. Let us denote E (T ) the expectation of the exible period
T , which is the necessary time that allows the rm to cumulate a certain reservation utility
u. We show that E (T ) is weakly higher than T 0, the duration of the xed-term contract,
which is necessary for the rm to obtain u in expectation, i.e. to satisfy its participation in
the project. E (T ) = T 0 only in the specic case in which the uncertainty does not exist, i.e.
in the situation in which exible-term contracts become unnecessary.
Formally, this di¤erence can be explained as follows. Under exible-term contracts the
cash ow of the rm is upper bounded by some level at which the cumulated cash ow reaches
the value u. Indeed, the contract ends when u is obtained. However, in bad states of the
world, the cash ow of the rm is not bounded from below. It can go as low as possible while
the contract lasts until the cash ow moves up to the upper bound at which u is obtained.
Hence an asymmetry between up and down shifts of the cash ow of the rm exists. When
the contract has a xed-term, such asymmetry does not exist. The rm takes the risk of
down shifts of the cash ow, but it also takes the advantage of any upstream evolution of the
cash ow. In expectation, the cumulated market benet of the rm in an uncertain market
is expected to be higher when upstream revenues are not limited. Consequently, this upper
boundary leads to the inequality E (T )  T 0.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a discrete time example of the
issue with three and four-period uncertainty. Section 3 describes the general model. Section
4 concludes.
2 Discrete time example
We take rst an example with three-period uncertainty and no discount factor. The cash
ow yt of the rm is distributed according to a simple random walk. Figure 1 shows the
possible states of yt. The initial state is y0 = 1. yt shifts up or down with 1 unity and equal
probabilities between any two periods from t = 0 to t = 3.
of roads.
2A particular trend of the literature is to investigate the time lag over which demand responds to changes
in its determinants, in particular in GDP (see for instance, Goodwin, 1976 and Oxera, 2005).
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Figure 1: States of yt under three-period uncertainty
Assume that the rm is risk neutral and has zero reservation utility. The rm makes an
investment I = 2, so that it participates if it obtains a cumulated cash ow of u = 2. The
utility u can be o¤ered to the rm in expectation, through a xed-term contract T 0, such
that E (eu) = u. Alternatively, u is o¤ered with certainty, through a exible-term contract
T .
If the xed-term contract is o¤ered to the rm, then the participation of the rm is
ensured if T 0 = 2. In this way the rm obtains an expected return
u = E (eu) = E (y1) + E (y2) = 1 + 1 = 2
Note that the value of y0 is relevant only for the forecast of future states; the rm starts
producing at date 0 and obtains a prot only from period 1. Also, because the rm is risk
neutral, the uncertainty about yt is irrelevant for its reservation utility. The rm obtains
in expectation E (eu) = u while the real utility eu can be either 5, 2 or  1. So the rm can
obtain a high prot 5  2 = 3 but it can also face losses of  3.
Under a exible-term contract the contract duration T 0 is determined as the rst passage
time at which the cumulated prot of the rm is at least u = 2. In our example, T = 1
whenever y1 = 2, which occurs with probability 1=2. With the same probability, y1 = 0, in
which case T  3. The inequality is strict if y1 = 0 is followed by y3 = 0 or  2. Overall,
T = 1 with probability 1=2, T = 3 with probability 1=8 and T > 3 with probability 3=8.
Evidently, E (T ) > T 0.
Suppose now that uncertainty lasts between t = 0 and t = 4, as in the Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2: States of yt under four-period uncertainty
As previously, if y1 = 2 then T = 1. If y1 = 0, y2 = 1 and y3 = 2 then T = 3. Otherwise,
T > 3. The novelty with respect to the previous example is that whenever yi < 2, for
i 2 f1; 2; 3g, the contract duration T is such that T > 4. Evidently, E (T ) > T 0 as before,
but at the same time E (T ) is higher under four-period uncertainty than under three-period
uncertainty. The same reasoning applies when any new period of uncertainty is added to
the problem. In the realistic case in which uncertainty lasts innitely, there is some positive
probability that T lasts innitely.
3 Continuous time model
Assume now that yt follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift  > 0 and volatility
  0, such that
dyt = ytdt+ ytdzt; (1)
with zt a simple Brownian motion.
3.1 Fixed-term contract
We assume for simplicity that the life time of the project is the innity. The term T 0 of
the contract is chosen in a way that the rm obtains in expectation its reservation utility:
E (eu) = u. The payo¤ of the rm is
Vfi (y0) = Ey0
Z 1
0
yte
 rtdt 
Z 1
T 0
yte
 rtdt

; (2)
with Ey0 the expectation operator, given the current state y0.
The rst term of Vfi (y0) is the expected discounted cash ow of the project. Because the
contract ends at time T 0, the discounted cash ow of all periods t > T 0 is substrated from
V (y0). The contracting term T 0 is xed, while the exact value yfi at which the contract ends
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is unknown. To nd its expected value, we can write from (1) the expression
Ey0 (yt) = y0e
t; 8 t  0; (3)
so that for t = T 0, Ey0 (yfi) = y0e
T 0. From (2) and (3) we can write
Vfi (y0) =
y0
r      e
 (r )T 0 y0
r   
The contract duration T 0 must solve the equality V (y0) = u, which is equivalent to
T 0 = ln
 
1  u

y0
r   
 1!  1r 
(4)
(4) shows that T 0 is independent of the volatility parameter . The rm is given u in
expectation while the risk of the project is borne by the rm.
3.2 Flexible-term contract
We dene  = inf ft  0 s:t: yt = yflg the termination period of the exible-term contract
(previously T ).  is the rst time at which the hitting value yfl is reached, i.e. the time
at which the market prot yfl is such that the rm obtains its reservation utility u. The
Appendix shows the standard calculation for the derivation of the payo¤ of the rm. For
any y < yfl, the value of the project is
Vfl (y) = Ey
Z 1
0
yte
 rtdt

 

y
yfl

Eyfl
Z 1
0
yte
 rtdt (5)
=
y
r     

y
yfl

yfl
r   ;
with  is the positive root of the quadratic
Q (x) =  (   1) 
2
2
+    r (6)
The rst term in the expression of V (y) is the expected discounted cash ow that the rm
would obtain if the contract lasted innitely. The second term substrates from this value
the discounted cash ow that corresponds to the periods beyond the contract. The contract
ends when some value yfl is hited by the stochastic variable for the rst time. The expression
y
yfl

is the discounting operator in the space of realizations of the stochastic variable, so
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that 
y
yfl

= E
 
e r

(7)
The following equation must be satised: V (y0) = u. This equation states the meaning
of the exible-term contract: the rm obtains a xed reservation utility u, from cumulating
market prots during an uncertain time interval. Hence we can derive the value yfl that
triggers the end of the contract, as follows
yfl = y0
 
1  u (r   ) y 10
 1
1  (8)
We move now to the comparison between T (y0) and T 0, where T (y0) is the expected
duration of the exible-term contract, such that
T (y0) = E ()
We need in this sense to analyze the discount factor (7). The right hand side of (7) is a
convex function of  . It follows by Jensen inequality that E (e r )  e rT (y0). We can then
write the following inequality
e rT (y0) 

y0
yfl

, T (y0)  
r
ln

yfl
y0

(9)
From (8) and (9) we can write
T (y0)  ln

1  ur   
y0
  
 1
1
r
(10)
With this result we can show the following.
Theorem 1. The expected duration T (y0) of the exible-term contract and the duration T 0
of the xed-term contract are such that T (y0)  T 0. T (y0) = T 0 if and only if  = 0.
Proof. Show rst T (y0)  T 0. We calculate
ln

1  ur   
y0
  
 1
1
r
 ln
 
1  u

y0
r   
 1!  1r 
,
ln

1  ur   
y0
 1
r   1r  1
 1
From (4), (10) and the above inequality, T (y0)  T 0.
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Show now T (y0) = T 0 ,  = 0. From T (y0) = E () and  = 0 we deduce T (y0) =  .
Also, from  = 0 and (6), we can write 
 1 =
r
r  . Using (4), (10) together with T (y0) = 
and 
 1 =
r
r  , we calculate
 = 0, E  e r = e rT (y0) , T (y0) = ln1  ur   
y0
  
 1
1
r
, T (y0) = T 0

The Appendix shows that the expression of T (y0) is
T (y0) =
8<: 1  122 ln
 
1  u (r   ) y 10
 1
1  ; if  > 1
2
2
1; if   1
2
2
(11)
Using (11), we show in Figure 1 how the expected contracting period of the exible-term
contract diverge from the duration of the xed-term contract.
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Figure 3: E ()  T as a function of 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that upper bound barriers often occur in economics
because of equilibrating mechanisms of the market. In a exible-term contract, it is not
the market that puts a frontier on the value of the project but the contract, which species
that the rm is not allowed to obtain returns that are over the threshold u. In a xed-term
contract, such barrier does not exist. This is why for the same reservation utility u that
must be given to the rm, T (y0)  T 0.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that the expected duration of the exible-term contract is higher than the
duration of the xed-term contract. This result holds under the assumption that uncertainty
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lasts over more than two periods and the private rm is risk neutral.
A natural continuation of this study would be to investigate the optimal contractual
regime. In particular, when the rm is able to renegotiate the contract in bad state of
the world, as is usually the case in public-private partnerships, the cash ow of the rm
is bounded from below, both under xed and exible-term contract. One could investigate
which type of contract is second best optimal, given that the risk born by the rm is limited
by renegotiation.
Furthermore, the literature on public-private partnerships has shown that there is a link
between contract duration and the incentives of the rm to underinvest. Ceteris paribus the
rm invests more if the duration is higher because cash ows of each period are directly pro-
portional to the amount of their investment (see Iossa and Martimort, 2008). One can infer
from our result that the incentives to underinvest are not the same under xed and exible-
term contracts since they have distinct expected duration. It would be then interesting to
compare the incentives to invest under the two contractual regimes.
The analysis of both renegotiation and incentives to invest under xed and exible-term
contracts is left for further research.
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Appendix
Find Vfl (y)
From (1) and applying Itos lemma,
Ey (dVfl) = yV 0fl (y) dt+
1
2
2y2V "fl (y) dt (12)
The value of the project for any yt = y and y < yfl is
Vfl (y) = ydt+ Ey (dVfl) e rdt (13)
From (12) and (13), we nd the di¤erential equation
yV 0fl (y) +
1
2
2y2V "fl (y)  rVfl (y) + y = 0 (14)
The initial condition is Vfl (0) = 0. From (14) and the initial condition we can rewrite the
Bellman equation (13) as
Vfl (y) =
y
r    + ay
 (15)
At y = yfl, we can write Vfl (yfl) = 0. Indeed, for any y  yfl the rm does not obtain
any cash ow because the contract ends. From the above expression of Vfl (y) and from
Vfl (yfl) = 0 one deduces
a =  

1
yfl

yfl
r   
By replacing it in (15) we nd the expression (5) in the main text.
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Find T (y0)
The demonstration follows closely Dixit (1993). We start from a random walk x, whose
expected intertemporal shift is
E [x] = (p  q)h;
where p is the probability of up move and q = 1  p the probability of down move. x takes
values h, where h > 0. Assume that xt can take values between a and b, a < b. We
denote i a natural number between  n and 0, where n > 0. i =  n corresponds to x = a
and i = 0 corresponds to x = b. The general formula for the states of the random walk as
function of the index i is x = b+ i h. Denote also Ti the expected time of a future event,
provided that the initial state is i. Ti satises the following di¤erence equation
Ti = t+ qTi 1 + pTi+1: (16)
The expected time of any future event is the sum of the next step t and the expected
remaining steps. With probability q the value y is reached from below and with probability
p is reached from above. This is a inhomogenious di¤erence equation. The homogeneous
part of (16) is similar to
Mi = qMi 1 + pMi+1:
We try a solution of the form Mi = 
i. Using p + q = 1 the equation is veried for  = 1
and  = (q=p). These two solutions are independent if q 6= p, so that the general solution of
the homogenous equation is
Mi = A+B (q=p)
i : (17)
The constant of the di¤erence equation leads us to guess as particular solution
Ti = E  i+ F (18)
If we replace this in the original equation we nd that (16) is veried by whatever real value
F and by the value of E that solves
E =   t
p  q : (19)
Using (17) (18) and (19) in (16), we can write the general solution of the di¤erence equation
as
Ti =  i t
p  q + A
0 +B (q=p)i
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The constants A0 and B are found from the boundary conditions. We use here that T n =
T0 = 0, i.e., the extreme points n and 0 are absorbing barriers for the random walk process.
We nd
Ti =
t
p  q
 
 n 1  (q=p)
i
1  (q=p) n   i
!
:
We are interested in the situation in which the state x is bounded only from above, at b.
Therefore a =  1, which implies n =1. Calculating the limit of the above expression, we
can write
Ti =
(
 i t
p q ; if p > q
1; if p < q : (20)
Remember that i  0, so that Ti is non-negative, which makes sense.
We use this for nding the time of a future event of an arithmetic Brownian motion.
Dene h = 
p
t. Also, p  q = 
2
h. With these denitions, Dixit (1993) show that as
t! 0 x becomes an arithmetic Brownian motion of mean dt and variance dt. Replace
these denitions in (20), together with i = x b
h
. (20) becomes
T (x) =
(
b x

, if   0;
1, if  < 0 : (21)
Move now from arithmetic to geometric Brownian motion, as in the main text. Use x =
ln (yt), where yt follows the geometric Brownian motion dened in the main text. Then, by
Itos lemma
dx =

  1
2
2

dt+ dz
where dz is a simple Brownian motion. Then  =    1
2
2 and b = ln (yfl), so that (21)
becomes
T (y0) =
(
1
  1
2
2
ln

yfl
y0

, if   1
2
2;
1, if  < 1
2
2
:
Replacing yfl from (8) we nd the expression (11) in the main text.
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